Gut thinking: the gut microbiome and mental health beyond the head by Lucas, G.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Lucas, G. ORCID: 0000-0001-5941-5233 (2018). Gut thinking: the gut 
microbiome and mental health beyond the head. Microbial Ecology in Health and Disease, 
29(2), 1548250.. doi: 10.1080/16512235.2018.1548250 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/21080/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16512235.2018.1548250
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=zmeh20
Microbial Ecology in Health and Disease
ISSN: (Print) 1651-2235 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zmeh20
Gut thinking: the gut microbiome and mental
health beyond the head
Grace Lucas
To cite this article: Grace Lucas (2018) Gut thinking: the gut microbiome and mental
health beyond the head, Microbial Ecology in Health and Disease, 29:2, 1548250, DOI:
10.1080/16512235.2018.1548250
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/16512235.2018.1548250
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 30 Nov 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 12
View Crossmark data
Gut thinking: the gut microbiome and mental health beyond the head
Grace Lucas
School of Health Sciences, City, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Background: In recent decades, dominant models of mental illness have become increas-
ingly focused on the head, with mental disorders being figured as brain disorders. However,
research into the active role that the microbiome-gut-brain axis plays in affecting mood and
behaviour may lead to the conclusion that mental health is more than an internalised
problem of individual brains.
Objective: This article explores the implications of shifting understandings about mental
health that have come about through research into links between the gut microbiome and
mental health problems such as depression and anxiety. It aims to analyse the different ways
that the lines between mind and body and mental and physical health are re-shaped by this
research, which is starting to inform clinical and public understanding.
Design: As mental health has become a pressing issue of political and public concern it has
become increasingly constructed in socio-cultural and personal terms beyond clinical spaces,
requiring a conceptual response that exceeds biomedical inquiry. This article argues that an
interdisciplinary critical medical humanities approach is well positioned to analyse the impact
of microbiome-gut-brain research on conceptions of mind.
Results: The entanglement of mind and matter evinced by microbiome-gut-brain axis
research potentially provides a different way to conceptualise the physical and social con-
comitants of mental distress.
Conclusion: Mental health is not narrowly located in the head but is assimilated by the
physical body and intermingled with the natural world, requiring different methods of
research to unfold the meanings and implications of gut thinking for conceptions of
human selfhood.
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Background
Gut thinking
Diagnosable mental health problems are said to affect
one in four people in any given year [1], they are
a leading source of disability globally, and new strategies
for prevention and treatment are vital [2]. But the
boundaries of these problems sit on shifting sands.
Since the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s [3]
and the analysis from critical psychiatry that has fol-
lowed [4], debates have continued about what is con-
stitutive of mental illness or mental disorder, especially
given the changing nature of psychiatric diagnostic
manuals over time [5]. Neuro-explanations of mental
health have dominated the last decades of mental health
research with mental disorders being re-cast as brain
disorders [6], but often on shaky evidential ground and
widely contested, especially by social psychiatrists [7].
Whilst there has been disagreement and controversy
over the past century, mental health has predominantly
been understood as related to the head. Biological psy-
chiatry’s paradigm of brain disorder provides mental
illness with a clear physicalized location there [6], whilst
a Cartesian dualist model of the immaterial mind
contrasts the intangible realm of mental thoughts with
the body and physical health [8]. If the body below the
head has been involved in understandingmental health,
it has often been viewed as a ‘dustbin’ expressing symp-
toms of illness from above [9]. However, in recent years,
research into the microbiome–gut–brain axis has fore-
grounded the impact of the gut microbiome on mental
health [10], inverting these dominant top-downmodels
of mental illness. This emerging evidence, which shows
observable links between gut dysbiosis and somemental
health conditions, suggests that mental health is not all
about the head, after all, leading to some paradigm
shifting interpretations and conclusions about what is
actually meant by ‘mental’ health, and how it should be
treated [12].
Evidence connecting microbiome-gut-brain com-
munication to psychiatric illness might seem to rele-
gate dualistic mind-body thinking to the past, but
a Cartesian divide between mental and physical
health runs down the middle of healthcare systems
(the NHS in the UK is divided in this way despite an
increasing focus on the provision of integrated care)
[13]. This divide is underpinned by language, which
both supports and constructs clinical and non-
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specialist understandings of the mind and the mental
as separate from the body and the physical. As psy-
chiatrist Edward Bullmore argues, a Cartesian ‘blind
spot’ [14] intervenes every time mental health is
redefined as our language separates out the mental
from physical life.
Whilst research into the microbiome–gut–brain axis
turns its attention from the brain to the gut and back
again, it arguably lacks the conceptual tools to investigate
the broader (social, cultural, linguistic) implications of
these shifts on the meaning of mental health. In particu-
lar, there is a critical imperative in analysing how lan-
guage is employed. This is because psychiatric
diagnostics frame mental health problems, and psychia-
try’s vocabularies and definitions are passed onto
patients. As philosopher Havi Carel argues, patients are
then ‘quick to mimic the medical discourse’ as they re-
articulate and explain their conditions to others [15].
Mental health is thus shaped and defined not only within
medical settings but also outside of the clinic. The dein-
stitutionalisation of mental health problems like depres-
sion, as argued by feminist scholar Elizabeth A. Wilson,
means that they are now ‘extensively entangled with
everyday life’ requiring an analysis that extends beyond
biomedicine to examine social, cultural and individual
constructs [16] (p. 10). Brain or neuro-explanations for
mental disorders have disseminated rapidly into popular
understanding [17]. Indeed, it is the dominant frame-
works of what physical cultures scholar, Simone Fullagar
describes as, ‘neuroscience and psy-expertise’ [18] (p.
42) that have provided a structure through which those
with mental health problems have sought to understand
their experiences in recent decades.
Interest in themicrobiome–gut–brain axis has already
led to the publication of a range of popular books on the
topic [19–21] which argue, in different ways, how com-
munication between the brain, gut, andmicrobiomemay
be responsible for a range of health problems including
depression and anxiety thereby challenging brain-shaped
understandings of mental health. Indeed, if, as Wilson
argues, the gut is ‘an organ of mind’ (p. 5) [16] then
critical questions are raised: What and where exactly is
our ‘mental’ health? How can this research contribute to
an improved understanding of selfhood beyond the
head? What kind of research is needed to investigate
the broader meanings and implications for understand-
ing human mental and physical life?
In this paper, I argue that an interdisciplinary
critical medical humanities framework [22] can
attend to such ‘ontological questions’ [23] raised by
this idea of the gut as an active part of the mind.
I take a feminist new materialist approach to argue
that – as feminist theorist Karen Barad writes – ‘mat-
ter matters’ and that human subjectivity is always
‘entangled’ in the world [24], in opposition to models
that theorise the power of ‘mind over body’ [25].
I propose that knowledge about the gut microbiome’s
effect on behaviour complicates understandings of
mental life and selfhood as contained within the
narrating, thinking brain. I build on research into
disciplinary entanglements developed in medical
humanities scholarship [26] to help contextualise
the broad impact of questions around the mind and
mental health, calling attention to the way in which
research into the microbiome–gut–brain axis illumi-
nates the interplay between biological, psychological
and social constructions of mental illness. Finally,
I use this critical framework to ask how research
into the gut microbiome relates to understandings
about selfhood, the way matter is conceptualized,
and how embodiment is theorised.
Mental health is in the head
All in the mind
Dualism, in philosophy of mind, is the theory that the
mind or the mental is different to the body and the
physical. This theory has lineage in ancient philosophical
thought. Plato thought that the soul, although united to
the body, existed beyond it [27]. Philosopher, Rene
Descartes (1596–1650) like Plato, also held to these
beliefs, but his dualism specifically separated out the
‘mind’ from the body [28]. Descartes’ shaping of the
palpable physical body as separable from the intangible
mind laid the ground for medicine to claim the physical
body as its domain [29]. By the nineteenth century – as
psychiatrist R.E. Kendell argues –Cartesian thinking was
supported by findings from medical dissection, which
showed that patients diagnosed with forms of madness
did not show ‘the obvious pathological changes’ that
were physically located in other diseases [30]. However,
this period saw a diverse range of opinions about the
origins of mental illness and – as psychiatry as
a discipline began to evolve – other traditions linking
the gut and the mind in more holistic conceptions of
mind-body interactions were also being re-explored and
studied [31]. Indeed, as historian Elizabeth A. Williams
argues, the work of the founder of French psychiatry,
Philippe Pinel, considered ‘mental and nervous ills’ to be
‘inextricable blends of physical and moral components’
influencing how French physicians approached neuroses
and some cases of mental illness [32]. But, as the nine-
teenth century wore on, some of the theories on the links
between gastric and mental illnesses were rejected [33],
emerging materialist psychiatric models, which posited
that mental illnesses were brain-based ‘cerebral illnesses’
[34] were also challenged [35] and Cartesian influences
took hold. Functional illnesses, as opposed to organic
disorders, were thought of as being ‘all in the mind’ and
therefore not real [36]. Psychogenic (non-physical, non-
substance-like) causes for mental disorders underpinned
influential theories and techniques of psychoanalysis and
psychiatric models into the twentieth century.
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Mental disorders: brain disorders
Although Cartesian understanding set the language of
mental against physical illness, in recent decades, images
of the brain have been used to depict mental health,
bringing a physical location back to understandings of
the mind. As Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
argue – in their critical examination of the ‘new brain
sciences’ – for a public highly engaged with brain culture,
‘mind seems visible in the brain itself’ [17] (p. 5). The
American National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
has stated that ‘mental disorders are disorders of the
brain’ [6] and The Brain & Behavior Research
Foundation uses the term ‘brain and behavior disorders’,
arguably taking the word ‘mental’ out of the
equation [37].
All in the mind or brain: the problems
Whether mental disorders are brain illnesses or
a matter of immaterial thoughts, there has been
a clear focus for mental health as conceptualised
within the head. Two recently launched UK charities
designed to support mental health, Heads Together
[38] and Headcase [39], and the meditation mental
health app, Headspace [40], underline this commonly
articulated emphasis. Indeed, ‘headclutcher’ imagery,
depicting a person holding their head in their hands,
is commonly used to accompany articles about men-
tal illness [41].
If medical and public understanding predominantly
locates mental health in the head, a question may follow
about why this is a problem. Mental health is certainly at
a critical point (in terms of economic, societal, and
personal costs) and existing research has struggled to
move forward the field [42]. Dualist formulations of
mental health separate people into parts and prop up
stigmatising beliefs aboutmental health as an individual’s
fault – either seen as not real or possible to control from
above by thought management. Furthermore, they com-
plicate understanding of the profound physical effects of
mental health issues. Indeed, whilst depression and anxi-
ety are defined as mental health problems, the palpable
physical symptoms attached to them uncomfortably
cross the medical divide [43]. Brain disorder models are
equally problematic, as philosopher Natalie F. Banner
argues, they operate at a reductionist ‘biological, subper-
son’ level and often exclude broad-based social, emo-
tional and psychological factors creating internalised
models of mental illness [36].
Getting out of the head: guts and mental
health
Research into the gut microbiome has started to
unsettle the narrow focus for mental health above
the neckline. The observed links between disturbance
of the gut microbiome (dysbiosis) and stress, anxiety,
and depression have shifted the research ground for
mental disorder [12,44,45]. In response to these
emerging findings, probiotics and dietary approaches
have been explored in terms of their ability to mod-
ulate microbiota and address symptoms [46].
Arguably, gut microbiome research starts to move
mental health out of the rule of the cognitive head
and provides evidence that the gut is storing, remem-
bering, feeling and thinking in itself. However, how
this research speaks to the questions around defini-
tions of mind and the mental needs to be addressed.
In examining how the gut microbiome might affect
states of mind in relation to the biology of microbiome–
gut–brain communication, a question is raised as to
what understanding of mental health andminded states
is being foregrounded. If microbiome–gut–brain axis
research is in alignment with an expanded brain dis-
order model of mental health – including the assump-
tions that go along with that model (mental states are
brain states) – then the same social psychiatry counter
arguments around the displacement of psycho-social
human reasons in understanding mental health may
also hold true. Furthermore, if it is under the indivi-
dual’s control to manage their microbiome, and this is
what affects mood and mental health, then the implica-
tion is that it is the job of the individual to fix it when
that mood is low. Indeed, mainstream publishers have
been keen to emphasise this particular facet of dietary
change in gut health, building on the multi-billion
dollar diet industry to sell books from early scientific
findings [47,48]. The idea that some people will be
enabled to beat or outwit gut bacteria with the right
access to the right foods or supplements, feeds into
a new gut consumer culture wherein some people will
be enabled and others disadvantaged. Recovery solu-
tions move sideways from the self-management thera-
peutic strategies of the cognitive model to ones based in
the gut. These potential alignments with existing under-
standings of mental wellbeing require careful analysis
and exploration.
A critical medical humanities intervention
Disciplinary entanglements
The questions pertaining to the shifting boundaries of
mind and the mental which are raised by evidence
about the gut microbiota on mental health cannot be
solved by biomedicine alone. In setting out the project
of a critical medical humanities focused on disciplinary
entanglement rather than the integration of separate
silos of investigation, Des Fitzgerald and Felicity
Callard suggest that it is necessary to, ‘understand how
practices of making, breaking and shifting boundaries
constitute illness and healing’. This analysis of shifting
boundaries has resonance for the analysis of gut
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thinking. In the re-assertion of the importance ofmatter
and physicality (beyond the brain) in research into the
gut microbiome’s effects on mental wellbeing, tradi-
tional healthcare distinctions between mental and phy-
sical health falter. Further boundaries are also called
into question, in terms of what constitutes human and
non-human, inside and out, and where the lines of
health and illness are placed. These lines do not exist
separately in different disciplinary spaces but speak to
what Fitzgerald and Callard discuss as the ‘deep entan-
glements of subjectivity, experience, pathology, incor-
poration, and so on, which cut across the ways in which
we understand both the human and her medicine
today’ [26]. The questions raised by these entangle-
ments are as resonant for biomedicine as they are for
humanities scholars and suggest the need for both new
methods and vocabularies that outmanoeuvre that
Cartesian ‘blind spot’ [14].
‘Matter matters’
Critical theorisation in humanities and social sciences
in the ‘turn towards the body’ – or ‘the material
turn’ – is entangled with the questions raised by
microbiome–gut–brain axis research into mental
health [49]. Affect theory [50], new materialism
[51], feminism [52] and phenomenology [53] have,
in different ways, sought to undo the devaluing of the
body as unthinking matter. The material turn in
humanities scholarship has asked questions about
the problematic idea of mind over matter both in
individual terms and in relation to the environment.
As Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman argue, in their
scholarship on feminist new materialism, the ‘deni-
gration of nature and the disregard for materiality
cannot be entirely disaggregated’ [52]. The dualist
conception of mind over matter does more than to
denigrate the body; it also positions the human sub-
ject as separate from – and superior to – the natural
world. Barad’s work, drawn upon by Fitzgerald and
Callard [26], helps to redress this, arguing that ‘being
is threaded through with mattering’ and, therefore,
the nature of materiality itself ‘is an entanglement’
[54]. The challenge from emerging evidence from the
gut microbiome counters the mind over matter
assumptions of Cartesian medicine, with bodies re-
framed as active and relational and comprised of
many different genomes of microorganisms, uproot-
ing psych-orientated, individualist, brain-dominant
models of behaviour.
Methods for gut thinking
The concept of the thinking gut may require both bio-
medicine and humanities disciplines to consider new
methods of research. Language tells us that the gut has
always been associated with ‘feeling states’ [11] – the
notion of ‘gut instinct’ and ‘trusting the gut’ remains
present in everyday English language. However, as fem-
inist writer Sara Ahmed explains in her book, The
Cultural Politics of Emotion, emotional states have also
been stratified. Visceral, gut feelings have been charac-
terised as bodily sensations [55]. In healthcare, unreliable
bodies have awaited interpretation by the superior, objec-
tive, rational mind endorsed by a positivist biomedical
epistemology. Subjective and experiential evidence is
usually downgraded versus the objective and empirical
in terms of medicine’s evidence hierarchies [56].
Healthcare’s bodies do not know, they are to be known.
Objectivity is understood to relate to reason and logic, but
if the gut is an organ of themind and the body is involved
in thinking, what does this mean for this hierarchy and
privileging ofmind over body?Howmight subjective and
individual bodies offer insights into minds and guts?
Indeed, might what Barad terms as the ‘material practice’
of knowing necessitate an epistemological shift? [57].
If the gut is thinking, it also demands
a methodological response from humanities disci-
plines. Medical humanities as interdisciplinary scho-
larship has developed a strong focus on applying
narrative to questions of medical practice and to the
experience of illness [58]. However, ‘embodied meth-
odologies’ [59] that actively look to incorporate body
sensation into research may provide scope to connect
more specifically with bodies and the sensory nature
of ‘mental’ experience and feeling from the gut. These
methodologies may range from paying attention to
bodies of researchers rather than side-lining them in
‘attempts to eliminate bias’ [60, p. 7], using sensory,
physical materials in qualitative interviews with par-
ticipants, and using bodies in the production or com-
munication of research (walking interviews [61],
body mapping [62] or representation in dance, for
example) [63]. The gut engages all the senses – from
the sound and feel of digestion, to the physical
response to the smell, taste or the sight of certain
foods or experiences and, as such, requires a sensory,
bodily approach to connect with these aspects.
In the final part of this paper, I turn to how the
concept of embodiment helps frame evidence from
the gut microbiome, moving mental health away
from the head and towards bodies intra-acting and
entangled with the world, asking what the implica-
tions of this are for future research.
Entangled meanings: what the microbiome–
gut–brain axis can contribute to improving
understanding about mental health
Biopsychosocial: horizontal entanglement
Mental health is often framed within a biopsychosocial
paradigm [64] – this very definition, despite its emphasis
on an integration of perspectives, speaks to disciplinary
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boundaries of biology, psychology, and social sciences,
each taking a vertical disciplinary cut through the mental
health conundrum. However, I suggest that the gut
microbiome’s evidential links tomood andmental health
ask for a much more of a horizontal slice through this
biopsychosocial construct. Research into the gut micro-
biome may be easily divided into the biological research
looking at bacteria in the laboratory, with social scientists
asking how the social and environmental are related to
this new method of internalising mental illness away
from social determinants, and psy-disciplines trying to
wrestle back selfhood to the head or drawing maps
against models of embodied cognition [65]. However,
I suggest that it is possible to take a horizontal perspec-
tive. This does not mean the eradication of disciplinary
boundaries and methodologies but offers an invocation
to look differently at the ‘entanglements’ [26] that pro-
blematize the vertical linearity from head to body as
much as they do the disciplinary silos.
The microbiome–gut–brain axis brings forward
a biological basis for mental health problems and
gestures towards the social and psychological, not as
separate factors, but as enmeshed with the biological.
Stress and environmental influences – things that
happen to us and shape our lives (even before birth)
cause biological changes and responses, and direct
expectations of and reactions to future events – not
just in terms of thinking from the head, but from
within the gut microbiota via ‘long-term modulation
of stress-related physiology and behaviour’ [66]. Gut
bacteria may be different depending on environment
and culture [67] suggesting that cultural and envir-
onmental factors are intermingled with bodies, not
separate to them. The social is not an externalised
force that contributes separately to the bio- and
psych-elements, the three are intertwined with one
another through the body, and in the world. This way
of thinking arguably problematizes the notion of
neoliberal selfhood [68] wherein health behaviours
(including attempts to improve mental health and
wellbeing) are part of a project of self-improvement
and empowerment directed from the head [69].
Gut selfhood: beyond narrative
Research into the microbiome–gut–brain axis has fore-
grounded an expandedmodel of selfhood that recognises
the influence that intestinal microbes have on cognition
and mood. This poses a challenge to what sociologist
Rose describes as the ‘regime of the self’, constructed
within the ‘psy’ sphere, wherein the physical body is to
be known and interpreted by the psyche-brain self in the
head [70] (p.3) Furthermore, not only does the gut
microbiome’s effect on mood and mental health suggest
an undoing of the head over body – mind over matter –
understandings about cognition, it has also been argued
that it challenges dominant Western philosophical ideas
of the boundaried self. Human microbiome research
unsettles the idea that human bodies are intact contain-
ers, guarding against external invader germs; thus recon-
ceptualising that which may have been previously
understood as the non-human, as a part of the human.
In a paper on this challenge to selfhood, Rees et al. [71]
suggest that evidence showing that microorganisms are
a part of human bodies (and the interaction of human
and microbial cells) challenges the humanities to re-
think what it is to be human away from the ‘untenable’
idea that they might be ‘mere nature’. They argue that
a ‘microbial humanities’ is needed to re-think these
‘more than human’ aspects of humanity. This position
perhaps risks ignoring the value of existing scholarship
that is working to undo nature-culture dualism [26].
However, it does speak to the way in which research on
the psychological side of the Cartesian divide has been
privileged in medical humanities scholarship on mental
health, which has built an emphasis on linguistic and
representational issues [72]. Arguably, this is because
mental health remains on the side of the Cartesian divide
that is linked to speech and language.
The microbiome–gut–brain connection suggests
a radical cut through Cartesian boundaries; shifting
the emphasis onto the corporeal and challenging the
discipline of medical humanities to conceptualise the
meaning of matter in relation to mental health.
Wilson demonstrates this kind of approach as she
argues that in the eating disorder, bulimia nervosa,
‘distress, anger, need, depression, comfort and attach-
ment have become primarily organic’ in nature, such
that the division between mood and gut is collapsed
[16] (p. 63). The gut responds, conveys and unfolds
mood. It is not merely a narrative representation or
a metaphor or a secondary somatic response to cog-
nitive thinking. As such, it raises the question of what
it means not only to have a body but to be a body,
especially when that body is deeply enmeshed with
that of microorganisms considered to be non-human.
To move beyond narrative representational
enquiry, scholarship on embodiment can be brought
towards understanding mental health. In line with
phenomenological principles of ‘being in the world’
[53], embodiment goes beyond ‘the body’. As
opposed to the static object body (which is managed
by the mind), I draw from an interdisciplinary per-
spective to theorise embodied experience as both
proprioceptive (the sense of the relative position of
one’s own parts of the body in space) [73] and as that
which is always relational, as embodiment scholar
Laura L. Ellingson puts it, as ‘mutually constitutive
with the world’ [61] (p.3).
Conclusions: embodied mental health
Mental health is problematic for medicine because it
cannot always be seen and shown; organically
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identified. A model of mental health related to gut
dysbiosis moves closer towards medicine’s preferred
methods of visual identification. The microbiome–
gut–brain axis, like the brain disorder model, seeks
to provide a physical, biological location for mental
disorder. The very fact that this model has gathered
so much attention and interest – with a wave of
books and media articles being published since the
revival of interest in gut-mind connections and the
characterisation of the ‘second brain’ [74] – arguably
speaks to the discomfort of conditions that can’t be
identified under the microscope of biomedical
research. Conditions that rest on subjective feeling
are labelled unexplained, functional, or a matter of
the intangible mind and, resultantly, are left in an
area of problematic stigmatisation. Proponents of
alternative models of health may reach to micro-
biome-gut-brain research to validate why it is neces-
sary to think holistically about health, but data
connecting the gut to mood, behaviour and mental
health does not provide a neat answer. Additionally,
the fact that biomedical evidence frameworks and
epistemologies control and constitute what is real
(organic) or not – and thereby arguably contribute
to stigma – mean that the possibility of such a holistic
view is challenged.
Research that suggests the importance of gut health
for mental health does not solve the Cartesian traps,
especially given the stronghold that language has in
shaping perception. However, it does call attention to
the possibilities for a model of ‘embodied mental
health’ [75], one that recognises that mental health is
not a separate entity from physical health and explores
the entanglements within a horizontal bio-psycho-
social framework. This model reimagines mental health
untied from its dualistic roots and unrestricted to the
head. It interrogates psychologically driven, individu-
alist constructions of health and wellbeing and
demands humanities scholars to think beyond narra-
tive means, to work in much more embodied terms.
For people trying to make sense of mental health
problems within ever-shifting models of causation –
moving from immaterial thoughts to neuroscience’s
brain disorder, to social psychiatry’s focus on social
determinants – research into the gut may seem like
just another layer of complex explanation. However,
such a reversal of head-down, mind over matter culture
potentially shifts the focus when it comes to interpreting
and making sense of whole-bodied experiences. In an
article about anxiety, author, Anna Spargo-Ryan, writes:
It lurches from my throat like a wave of black tar and
I choke on it and the world caves in around me and
I am drowning. [76]
This is anxiety felt in the ‘very self’ of her body; it is
violent and physical and leads to a sense of suffocating
enclosure and sensory shutdown. Anxiety is visceral,
digestive, figured as surging up, lurching and choking.
Anxiety can equally rise from the ground up, from
interaction and experience that accumulates and shapes
the sense of being a body in the world. Research into
the relationship between the gut and the mind does not
prove or validate that mental health is beyond the head,
but it does entangle the biological, social and psycho-
logical. It explores the inseparability of mind and mat-
ter and enables a different conceptualisation of mind
and the mental to be opened up.
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